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 Appellant Kim Davis (“Davis”) hereby submits this Reply in support of her 
motion for a stay pending appeal of the district court’s August 12, 2015 order. 
INTRODUCTION 
In opposing a stay pending appeal in this first-in-the-nation case, Plaintiffs 
rehash and recycle theories that ignore enumerated constitutional and statutory rights 
and outright flout the religious liberty analysis that the Supreme Court has described 
as the “most demanding test known to constitutional law.”1 Although Plaintiffs are 
ready to ride roughshod over Davis’ individual rights without a full hearing on the 
merits of the undisputed constitutional “debate” and “conflict” engendered here, this 
Court should allow neither Plaintiffs’ unrelenting desire to force Davis to abandon 
her conscience nor the district court’s errors and similar rush to judgment to forever 
displace Davis’ conscience and religious liberty. In a glaring omission to the merits 
of a stay, Plaintiffs failed to address, let alone distinguish, prior stays pending appeal 
granted by this Court in other marriage cases even though the effect of those stays 
absolutely barred couples from obtaining marriage licenses (or having licenses 
recognized) in their states (including Kentucky) and did not implicate irreversible 
infringements upon a particular individual’s enumerated rights of conscience, 
religious liberty, and speech, as are involved here. The substantial legal questions 
                                                          
1  See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534 (1997) (discussing the 
analogous federal RFRA). 
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presented here, along with the balancing of the equities, warrant maintaining the 
status quo and granting a stay until this appeal of first impression is finally resolved. 
REPLY ARGUMENT 
I. Plaintiffs’ claims and purported harms are neither clearly established 
nor clearly defined by precedent from this Court or the Supreme Court. 
 In opposing a stay, Plaintiffs proclaim that they “should not have to wait any 
longer to exercise their fundamental right to marry,” and declare that “marriage 
licenses in Rowan County” are a “legal prerequisite for marriage in Kentucky,” see 
Pls.’ Resp. to Emergency Mot. to Stay (“Pls.’ Resp.”), at 2, 16, but nothing (and no 
one) is barring them from exercising the right to marry whom they want to marry in 
Kentucky. Indisputably, Kentucky is recognizing marriages, including same-sex 
“marriages,” so Plaintiffs can marry whom they want (even while this appeal is 
pending). Also, Kentucky is providing for the issuance of marriage licenses in more 
than 130 marriage licensing locations spread across the state, including many 
locations within 30-45 minutes of where Plaintiffs allegedly reside, so Plaintiffs can 
readily obtain Kentucky marriage licenses from any one of those locations (even 
while this appeal is pending). Accordingly, the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims must be 
evaluated in terms of the state-wide marriage licensing scheme and whether that 
scheme, which is currently providing more than 130 locations for Plaintiffs to obtain 
marriage licenses, directly and substantially burdens these Plaintiffs’ right to marry. 
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Instead, Plaintiffs demand (and the district court erred in finding) a newfound 
constitutional right to have a marriage license issued by a particular person in a 
particular county, irrespective of the burdens placed upon that individual’s freedoms. 
But no precedent from this Court or the Supreme Court (including Obergefell v. 
Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015)) establishes a fundamental constitutional right to 
obtain a marriage license in a particular county authorized and signed by a 
particular person. According to Plaintiffs’ unprecedented view, and adopted in 
error by the district court, the mere act of traveling approximately 30 minutes equates 
to a federal constitutional violation of the right to marry and, not just that, but a 
violation purportedly so manifest that it trumps individual conscience and religious 
freedom protections that are enumerated in the Kentucky RFRA and the United 
States and Kentucky Constitutions. But this alleged burden is no more 
constitutionally suspect than having to drive 30 minutes to a government office (for 
any reason) in the first place. Thus, Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate, as they 
must, a direct and substantial burden on their right to marry in Kentucky. 
II. The impending harms to Davis’ conscience, religious liberty, and free 
speech rights are protected under the Kentucky RFRA and the United 
States and Kentucky Constitutions. 
In opposing a stay, Plaintiffs fundamentally misconstrue the applicability of 
the Kentucky RFRA, which directly implicates the merits of the parties’ competing 
claims and the balancing of harms engendered by this litigation. 
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First, Kentucky marriage law cannot be interpreted without also considering 
and applying the Kentucky RFRA. The Kentucky RFRA is housed under Chapter 
446 of Kentucky’s statutes, which is entitled “Construction of Statutes,” and 
includes such other generally applicable provisions as “Definitions for Statutes 
Generally,” “Computation of Time,” “Severability,” and “Titles, Headings, and 
Notes.” KY. REV. STAT. §§ 446.010, 446.030, 446.090, 446.140. Even more 
specifically, the Kentucky RFRA is included under a section of Chapter 446 reserved 
for “Rules of Codification.” Moreover, the Kentucky RFRA protects the religious 
freedom of all “persons” in Kentucky.2 Thus, Plaintiffs’ declarations that “Kentucky 
law specifically imposes upon County Clerks the obligation to issue” SSM licenses 
and “Kentucky’s administrative scheme requires all county clerks to issue marriage 
licenses,” see Pls.’ Resp., at 3, 8, fail to consider the necessary Kentucky RFRA 
analysis embedded in any legislative or regulatory scheme, including Kentucky’s 
state-wide marriage licensing scheme. This analysis, though necessary (albeit 
untested) before June 26, 2015, is especially significant in the wake of Obergefell 
and Gov. Beshear’s SSM Mandate. See also United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, 
Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (“If a less restrictive alternative would serve the 
Government’s purpose, the legislature must use that alternative.”) (emphasis added). 
                                                          
2  While “person” is not defined in the Kentucky RFRA, it is defined in 
Kentucky’s general definitions statute to include “individuals,” and publicly elected 
officials are not excluded. See KY. REV. STAT. § 446.010(33). 
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Second, Plaintiffs hijack the substantial burden analysis under the Kentucky 
RFRA. Critically, neither Plaintiffs nor the district court are arbiters of the burden 
placed upon Davis’ religious beliefs, and their attempts to occupy that position usurp 
and contradict clear Supreme Court precedent. Similar to the federal RFRA, the 
Kentucky RFRA asks whether a government mandate (such as Gov. Beshear’s SSM 
Mandate) “imposes a substantial burden on the ability of the objecting parties” to act 
“in accordance with their religious beliefs,” not, as Plaintiffs suggest, whether 
Davis’ religious beliefs about authorizing SSM licenses are reasonable. See Burwell 
v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751, 2778 (2014) (emphasis in original).  
Davis believes that providing the marriage authorization “demanded by” Gov. 
Beshear’s SSM Mandate is “connected with” SSM “in a way that is sufficient to 
make it immoral” for her to authorize the proposed union and place her name on it. 
See id. Davis is not claiming that the mere “administrative” act of recording a 
document, see, e.g., Pls.’ Resp., at 5, 11, 13-16, substantially burdens her religious 
freedom. County clerks are not mere scriveners for recording a marriage document. 
Instead, county clerks authorize the marriage license for the proposed union, place 
their name on each and every license they authorize, and call the union “marriage.” 
See KY. REV. STAT. § 402.100(1)-(3). Such participation in and approval of SSM 
substantially burdens Davis’ religious freedom because she is the person authorizing 
and approving a proposed union to be a “marriage,” which, in her sincerely-held 
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religious beliefs, is not a marriage. She can neither call a proposed union “marriage” 
which is not marriage in her view, nor authorize that union. Importantly, Davis is 
not claiming a substantial burden on her religious freedom or free speech rights if 
someone else authorizes and approves a SSM license devoid of her name. Davis is 
also not claiming that her religious freedom or free speech rights are substantially 
burdened if she must complete an opt-out form to be exempted from issuing SSM 
licenses, as Kentucky law already permits for other licensing schemes. 
Accordingly, it is not for Plaintiffs or the district court to say that Davis’ 
religious beliefs “are mistaken or insubstantial,” but instead the “‘narrow function . 
. . in this context is to determine’ whether the line drawn reflects ‘an honest 
conviction,’ and there is no dispute that it does.” Hobby Lobby, 134 S.Ct. at 2778-
79 (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716 
(1981)) (emphasis added). Here, Plaintiffs do not dispute that Davis holds sincerely-
held religious beliefs about marriage (see Pls.’ Resp., at 14)—the requisite “honest 
conviction.” It is therefore improper to conclude that such beliefs are “incidental” or 
“not ris[ing] to the level” of a substantial burden, see id. at 6, 8, 15-16, for that is 
just another way of deeming Davis’ religious beliefs as “flawed,” which is a step 
that the Supreme Court has “repeatedly refused to take.” See Hobby Lobby, 134 S.Ct. 
at 2778. But it is the exact leap that Plaintiffs invite, and the district court took in 
error. By way of Gov. Beshear’s SSM Mandate, Davis is being threatened by loss of 
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job, civil liability, punitive damages, sanctions, and private lawsuits in federal court 
if she “refuse[s] to act in a manner motivated by a sincerely held religious belief.” 
KY. REV. STAT. § 446.350. Certainly, the Kentucky RFRA is designed to protect a 
person from choosing between one’s lifelong career in the county clerk’s office and 
one’s conscience, or between punitive damages and one’s religious liberty. 
Third, the proffered compelling government interests that purportedly 
overcome the burden on Davis’ religious freedom (i.e., eradicating discrimination 
and uniformity in the issuance and recording of marriage licenses, see Pls.’ Resp., at 
9) are the type of “broadly formulated” governmental interests that fail to satisfy 
RFRA-based strict scrutiny because they do not show any actual harm in granting a 
“specific exemption” to a “particular religious claimant.” See Gonzales v. O Centro 
Espirata Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 430-31 (2006). Providing 
accommodation to Davis—who is treating all persons the same—neither endorses 
discrimination nor prevents qualified individuals from uniformly acquiring 
Kentucky marriage licenses from more than 130 marriage licensing locations. 
Fourth, even if a compelling interest can be shown, this Court cannot ignore 
application of the “exceptionally demanding” least-restrictive-means standard, and 
the many less restrictive alternatives that would (1) provide Plaintiffs with a 
marriage license in Rowan County, Kentucky and (2) simultaneously protect 
Davis’ religious freedom. Plaintiffs’ silence on these numerous alternatives does not 
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mute their availability, even if they cost more. Hobby Lobby, 134 S.Ct. at 2780. The 
Kentucky RFRA requires clear and convincing proof of both a particularized 
compelling government interest in infringing Davis’ religious freedom and the least 
restrictive means for achieving that interest. In Plaintiffs’ view, only a “uniform 
system” that provides no religious accommodation whatsoever is possible, and 
permissible. See Pls.’ Resp., at 10. But legislative enactments in other states, such as 
North Carolina and Utah, see, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-5.5, and Utah S.B. 297 
(2015 Gen. Sess.), and proposals in this state, demonstrate the intolerance and 
manifest error of this view, see, e.g., D.E. 39-6, An Act Relating to Marriage, Ky. 
House Bill 101 (2016 Reg. Sess.). Plaintiffs’ conclusion also disregards that 
“government may (and sometimes must) accommodate religious practices,” Hobbie 
v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 144-45 (1987), and 
repudiates the Sixth Circuit’s finding that “[o]ur Nation’s history is replete with . . . 
accommodation of religion.” ACLU v. Mercer County, Ky., 432 F.3d 624, 639 (6th 
Cir. 2005). Thus, despite providing lip service that courts are to “strike a balance” 
between rights, see Pls.’ Resp., at 7, Plaintiffs, in fact, demand unrelenting adherence 
and submission to their orthodoxy—that in all places, and under any circumstances, 
SSM trumps a person’s religious liberty when the two conflict, despite the measured-
in-millenia history of marriage as exclusively a union between a man and a woman, 
and despite Davis’ undisputed sincerely-held religious beliefs about marriage. 
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Accommodating sincere religious beliefs and actions (or non-actions) motivated by 
those beliefs promotes the religious pluralism and tolerance that have made this 
country distinctive. Plainly, this is not a situation where an accommodation of Davis’ 
religious objections will swallow the general law on marriage and marriage licenses 
in Kentucky, because licenses are readily available in more than 130 marriage 
licensing offices throughout Kentucky. 
Finally, Plaintiffs also advance a “third party beneficiary” argument that was 
squarely rejected by the Supreme Court in Hobby Lobby. “Nothing” in the Kentucky 
RFRA supports giving the government “an entirely free hand to impose burdens on 
religious exercise so long as those burdens confer a benefit on other individuals,” 
for if any governmental act is construed as benefiting a third party then all 
government actions can be deemed “entitlements to which nobody could object on 
religious grounds, rendering RFRA meaningless.” See Hobby Lobby, 134 S.Ct. at 
2781, n. 37. But here the government can “readily arrange” for means of providing 
Kentucky marriage licenses to the Plaintiffs who are “unable to obtain them . . . due 
to [Davis’] religious objections,” id., thereby abrogating Plaintiffs’ concern about 
“exemptions” that allegedly “adversely impact others.” See Pls.’ Resp., at 10. 
III. As the district court did in its Injunction, Plaintiffs want this Court to 
short-circuit the public interest at stake in this lawsuit. 
 The public has no interest in coercing Davis to irreversibly violate her 
conscience and religious freedom when ample less restrictive alternatives are readily 
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available. See, e.g., Dayton Area Visually Impaired Persons, Inc. v. Fisher, 70 F.3d 
1474, 1490 (6th Cir. 1995) (finding that the public has a “significant interest” in the 
“protection of First Amendment liberties”); O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do 
Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 973, 1010 (10th Cir. 2004) (“[P]ursuant to RFRA, 
there is a strong public interest in the free exercise of religion even where that interest 
may conflict with [another legislative scheme].”). 
REPLY CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above and in prior briefing, Davis respectfully 
requests that this Court grant immediate consideration and enter an order staying the 
district court’s August 12, 2015 order pending resolution of the appeal in this Court.3 
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3  In any event, and out of an abundance of caution, if this Court denies a stay 
pending appeal, Davis further asks this Court to grant a temporary stay for Davis to 
submit an emergency application for a stay to the Supreme Court. 
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